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Photo by Mike Lameki. The photo is of Lualaba Province, taken during the riots in Fungurume on August 19, 2019.
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“Displacing artisanal miners is like whack-a-mole (…) what they will 
end up doing is just brutalizing the miners in order to make them too 
afraid to come back.” 
(Mining consultant cited in Reuters 20191)
INTRODUCTION
In June 2019, the boomtown of Kafwaya, situated on the edge of 
southeastern Democratic Republic of ‘Congo’s Tenke Fungurume 
copper and cobalt mining concession (TFM), received a visit from a 
Congolese army officer. He told the town’s inhabitants, thousands of 
whom were making a living from artisanal mining, to end their illegal 
activities inside TFM’s mining sites.2 A few days after his visit, soldiers 
set fire to market stalls and established a camp close to Kafwaya. A 
week later, without any prior warning, the Congolese army invaded 
the boomtown at night, looting a local school, and burning not only 
tarpaulin houses belonging to artisanal miners, but also many of the 
homes of Kafwaya’s farming population.3 
 Soldiers of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo (henceforth FARDC) were also deployed around Kamoto 
Olive Virgule (KOV), an open-pit copper and cobalt mine close to 
Kolwezi. The deployment followed a tragic accident in the mine 
on June 27, 2019, which killed 43 artisanal miners.4 According 
to the mine’s owner, the Kamoto Copper Company (KCC),5 the 
concession had been witnessing the illegal entry of approximately 
2000 artisanal miners per day.6 Richard Muyej, the governor of 
the Lualaba province, announced that the Congolese army would 
remain present around the concession “for a limited time” to prevent 
artisanal miners from entering.7 The military operation around the 
KOV mine led to the forced eviction of thousands of artisanal miners 
as well as to a series of protests, which went hand in hand with the 
looting of local shops and the arrest of 20 people.8 
 Finally, on August 18 and 19, 2019, two months after the 
events in Kafwaya, the city of Fungurume was the scene of yet another 
series of violent incidents involving artisanal miners and security 
forces. After the police seized a load of illegally mined minerals 
at a roadblock, thousands of artisanal miners occupied the Route 
Nationale, burned vehicles, looted a market, and destroyed a police 
station. In a desperate attempt to crush the sudden uprising, the 
police opened fire on the crowd of artisanal miners, leaving 3 people 
dead and at least 10 wounded. Since the riots led to the interruption 
of all traffic – including the transport of mining products – between 
Kolwezi and Likasi for almost two days, the Lualaba province 
governor was forced to come to Fungurume for an emergency meeting 
with local authorities and stakeholders. Several measures were taken 
to calm things down, including an announcement that the artisanal 
miners would be able to temporarily continue their activities in a 
mining concession adjacent to the TFM concession and reportedly 
belonging to a close relative of former Congolese President Joseph 
Kabila.
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF REPRESSION 
IN SOUTHEASTERN DRC’S MINING SECTOR
Since the official conclusion of the second Congolese war in July 
2003, Congolese authorities have tried several strategies to end the 
presence of artisanal miners or creuseurs in concessions belonging 
to industrial mining corporations. Apart from entering into 
negotiations with representatives of artisanal mining communities 
and launching alternative employment programs, they have also tried 
to solve the matter through interventions from security forces (Hönke 
2014; Geenen 2014; Verweijen 2017; Katz-Lavigne 2019). As can 
be gathered from the incidents described above, between June and 
August 2019, repressive measures against artisanal miners have been 
remarkably harsh in the copper and cobalt region of southeastern 
DRC. While it is not the first time that such measures were taken, 
and while it is important to consider them as part of a broader set of 
government strategies to address problems with artisanal mining, it 
cannot be denied that, at least during the period under investigation, 
there was a sudden upsurge in violent interventions against artisanal 
miners. 
 Repression against artisanal miners is not unique to the 
DRC. In several mineral-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such 
as Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania, recent years have witnessed 
a similar trend of governments trying to solve their problems with 
artisanal mining through violent interventions (Metcalf & Veiga 
2012: 182; Spiegel 2017; Maringira & Nyamunda 2017; Holterman 
2014). The alternation between episodes of excessive and brutal state 
violence against artisanal miners and periods of greater tolerance of 
their presence can only properly be understood if one examines the 
political context in which mining activities occur. As Tschakert has 
suggested in an insightful article about repression in Ghana’s artisanal 
and small-scale gold mining sector, “authoritative ordering of mining 
spaces that have become ‘unruly’ (….) creates an illusion of hegemony 
over otherwise messy, dysfunctional, corrupt, and conflict-ridden 
resource-rich contexts in which elite capture is pervasive and the 
state a complicit actor” (2016: 128). The word ‘illusion’ captures the 
situation in southeastern DRC quite well. In fact, despite the violent 
interventions, little to nothing has been done to address the so-called 
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‘enabling environment’, in other words, the factors that are at the 
root of the problems with artisanal miners. As a recent report by the 
International Crisis Group suggests, the lack of structural solutions 
is in large part due to the fact that local politicians, businessmen, and 
even members of the Congolese army have personal interests in the 
artisanal mining business and the illicit trade in minerals originating 
from industrial mining concessions.9  
 This research brief aims to take a closer look at the political 
dimensions of repressive actions against artisanal miners in 
southeastern DRC. It argues that the decision to act repressively 
against them was driven by the fluctuating demand for cobalt on 
the international market as part of the so-called ‘green revolution’. 
These price fluctuations created a situation in which the relationship 
between industrial and artisanal mining became very tense and violent, 
with both parties seeking to maintain access to mineral-bearing land, 
and the Congolese government coming under increased pressure to 
protect the mining rights of the mining industry. At the national 
level, the most important explanatory factors for the repressive 
actions include uncertainty about the future of the Congolese mining 
sector after the 2018 elections and corporate demand to provide 
better protection against the invasions of its concession by artisanal 
miners. At the sub-national level, the eagerness of governor Muyej to 
promote the reputation of Lualaba as a stable mining province and 
the power struggle between local big men in Fungurume also help 
account for the violent interventions against creuseurs. 
 The research brief is based on fieldwork in the former Katanga 
province10 in August 2019. Interviews were held with politicians, 
civil society activists, public servants, (former) company officials, 
customary chiefs, and various groups of people living and working 
in the Tenke Fungurume Mining concession. In addition to this, the 
paper also builds on findings from extensive fieldwork in southeastern 
DRC since 2005.
TENSIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL AND ARTISANAL 
MINING IN SOUTHEASTERN DRC
In 2018, the Katanga region, situated in the southeastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, was by far the world’s biggest cobalt 
producer, while it also ranked 4th in terms of copper production.11 
In addition to this, the Katanga region holds various deposits of 
minerals associated with copper, including zinc, silver, uranium, lead, 
and germanium. Katanga’s reputation as one of the richest mining 
areas in the world has led to the growth of an industrial mining 
industry in the first half of the twentieth century and the emergence 
of a field of tension between industrial and artisanal mining around 
the turn of the millennium.
 Between 1906 and 1967, the industrial exploitation of copper 
and cobalt in Katanga was in the hands of the Union Minière 
du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), a Belgian mining company that, 
through the provision of accommodation, education, healthcare, 
and food rations, developed a policy of corporate paternalism 
towards employees and their families (Dibwe dia Mwembu 2001; 
Rubbers 2013). In the early years of its existence, the successor to 
the UMHK, the state company Gécamines continued this policy, 
while also remaining one of the biggest copper and cobalt producers 
in the world. However, from the second half of the 1970s onwards, 
Katanga’s mining industry went through a gradual decline due to 
developments in the global economy and political instability at the 
regional, national, and provincial levels.
 Under pressure from major international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, the government of Kengo wa 
Dondo carefully started privatizing the Congolese mining sector 
in the mid-1990s. In most cases, foreign companies were expected 
to contribute capital and expertise in exchange for acquiring 
management and exploitation rights formerly held by Gécamines. 
Thanks to these new agreements, it became possible to restart 
individual branches of Gécamines, not only in terms of exploration 
and the processing of tailings but also production itself (Kennes 
2000: 311-312; Verbruggen 2006: 29). 
 After the end of the second Congolese war (1998-2003), 
during which the Kabila regime allocated several of Gécamines’ 
copper mines to businessmen close to Mugabe in exchange for 
Zimbabwe’s military assistance (Carter Center 2017: 19), the World 
Bank attempted to give the Katangese mining sector a boost by 
promoting foreign investment. Considering the mining sector an 
important dynamic force in Congo’s recovery, it pushed for major 
reforms, including the restructuring of mining parastatals such 
as Gécamines, the preparation of a new mining registry, and the 
promulgation of a new mining code in July 2002 (Verbruggen 2006: 
29; Carter Center 2017). 
 As a result of the gradual decrease in conflict as a whole, 
the organization of the first democratic elections since Congolese 
independence in 2006, and the adoption of a new mining code, 
Katanga’s investment climate became a lot more favorable. Another 
factor that certainly had a positive influence on Katanga’s industrial 
mining sector was the spectacular increase of copper and cobalt 
prices on the international market. While the global demand for 
copper rose due to a combination of increased consumer spending 
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and expanding infrastructure in countries such as India and China, 
the global demand for cobalt went up due to the worldwide increase 
in chemical applications such as catalysts and rechargeable batteries 
(Global Witness 2006). 
 The revival of industrial mining activities in Katanga coincided 
with the expansion of artisanal mining. At the end of the 1990s, 
Mobutu’s successor Laurent-Désiré Kabila had paved the way for the 
development of the artisanal mining sector in the southeastern part 
of the DRC. Artisanal miners were permitted to enter unused mining 
concessions belonging to the state mining company Gécamines. 
Thousands of men, women, and children moved to the mining areas 
to earn a living through mining and/or mining-related activities. 
Several government services took advantage of the growth of the 
Katangese artisanal mining sector to generate revenues through the 
imposition of taxes and fines (Cuvelier 2011; Makori 2017). 
 As time went by, the artisanal mining sector became 
increasingly formalized. One of the most important measures in 
this context, especially regarding the central theme of this research 
brief, was the introduction of the mining code of 2002, which was 
primarily meant to create a better and more stable environment 
for foreign investment. In creating such an environment, the code 
seriously reduced the maneuvering space of artisanal miners. It 
stated that artisanal mining would henceforth only be allowed in 
so-called Zones d’Exploitation Artisanale (ZEA), where industrial 
or semi-industrial mining was not viable. While, on the one hand, 
creuseurs often found themselves forcefully evicted from mining 
sites for which the official exploration and/or exploitation sites were 
granted to transnational mining companies, on the other hand, the 
number of ZEA that were put at the disposal of the artisanal mining 
population was far too small to accommodate the tens of thousands 
of people using artisanal mining as (one of) their principal source(s) 
of livelihood (Sovacool 2019: 920; Cuvelier 2011b; Cuvelier 2017; 
SARW 2020). 
 The second set of measures contributing to the further 
formalization of the Katangese artisanal mining sector resulted from 
the international campaign against so-called ‘conflict minerals’ in 
eastern DRC. Since the early 2000s, when the first NGO and United 
Nations reports about the economic agendas of warring parties in 
Africa’s Great Lakes region came out, the illegal exploitation of 
minerals such as gold, diamonds, tin, tantalum, and tungsten was 
considered one of the principal causes of the continuation of armed 
conflict in eastern DRC. In order to break this supposedly direct link 
between resource extraction and violent conflict, several initiatives 
were taken to prevent conflict minerals from entering international 
markets and then to increase the transparency of the Congolese 
artisanal mining sector (Bashwira & Cuvelier 2019: 964). These 
initiatives mainly included the establishment of several traceability 
and certification mechanisms, but also entailed the streamlining 
of the mineral supply chain and the compulsory formation of 
cooperatives for artisanal miners (de Haan & Geenen 2016; Iguma & 
Hilhorst 2017; SARW 2020). 
 The forced establishment of mining cooperatives was part 
of a larger strategy on the part of the Congolese government and 
international policymakers to formalize the Congolese artisanal 
mining sector and to bring it more firmly under government control. 
Apart from the fact that every cooperative was expected to work in a 
specific area earmarked for artisanal mining, a so-ZEA (cfr. supra), 
both the cooperatives and their members also needed to be officially 
registered (de Haan & Geenen 2016: 826). 
 In 2017-2018, there was a spectacular rise in cobalt prices on 
the international market. The cobalt boom was due to the growing 
demand for rechargeable batteries as part of the so-called ‘green 
revolution’ or the search for more environmentally friendly and 
sustainable sources of energy. Cobalt is a key ingredient in lithium-
ion batteries, which can be found in electric vehicles and various 
electronic devices such as smartphones and laptops. There has also 
been a growing interest in super-sized rechargeable batteries to store 
electricity coming from solar and wind sources (Sovacool 2019).
 In 2018, Congo was the world’s most important mined 
cobalt source, supplying more than 60 percent of the global mined 
cobalt production.12 As a result of the highly optimistic views about 
the future of the electric car and the widely-held belief that the 
existing cobalt supply would not be able to meet the growing global 
demand, companies like Glencore started expanding their industrial 
mining operations in the DRC. Meanwhile, the cobalt supply from 
Congolese artisanal mining sources also more than doubled between 
2016 and 2018. Most of these minerals went to China, which is 
probably the most prominent player in the global cobalt industry, 
not only in producing cobalt-containing products but also in terms 
of strategically securing access to raw cobalt minerals across the globe 
(Gully & McCullough 2019).
 Cobalt started losing a lot of its value from the end of March 
2018 onwards. Several factors help to account for this sudden price 
drop. First of all, the rise in production in the DRC had given rise to 
an oversupply on the global market. The available stocks of cobalt 
were much bigger than the global demand, primarily because sales of 
electric vehicles were much lower than initially forecasted. Second, in 
May 2018, Elon Musk, the founder of the ‘world’s most well-known 
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electric car producer, Tesla, announced in a letter to shareholders 
that his company was making efforts to reduce its reliance on cobalt 
drastically.13 Musk’s company was eager to put an end to its high 
dependence on cobalt because of the high costs and because of 
increasing global concerns over the circumstances under which the 
mineral is extracted.14 
 In June 2020, however, news reports about a remarkable deal 
between Tesla and Glencore suggested that cobalt will probably 
continue to play a crucial role in the production of car batteries for 
electric vehicles in the near future. Anticipating an expected surge in 
the global demand for cobalt in the coming years, Tesla struck a deal 
to buy Congolese cobalt from Glencore to secure cobalt supply to 
two new car plants: one in Berlin and one in Shanghai.15 In its 2019 
Impact Report, Tesla tried to reassure its shareholders and clients 
about its commitment to cobalt ethical and responsible sourcing. 
The report noted that “because Tesla recognizes the higher risks of 
human rights issues within cobalt supply chains, particularly for 
child labor in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we have 
made a significant effort to establish processes to remove these risks 
from our supply chain.”16
 In sum, it is clear that Katanga has a long history of industrial 
mining. The emergence and growth of the artisanal mining sector can 
be attributed to the climate of political and socio-economic instability 
of the past three decades, the decline of the state company Gécamines, 
and the search for alternative income-generating strategies amongst 
the impoverished Katangese population. In many places, industrial 
and artisanal mining actors have competed for access to the same 
mineral-bearing land. This competition has grown increasingly tense 
and antagonistic as a result of the growing global demand for cobalt.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE CONGOLESE 
MINING SECTOR AFTER THE 2018 ELECTIONS 
The investment climate in the Congolese mining sector has witnessed 
a number of significant changes as a result of a growing spirit of 
‘resource nationalism’: an ambition on the part of the former Joseph 
Kabila government to regain more control over the management 
of the country’s natural resource wealth, a trend that has also been 
observed in several other resource-rich countries in the Global South 
(Gilbert 2020; Huggins & Kinyondo 2019). On February 8, 2017, a 
new law on subcontracting was promulgated, requiring companies in 
the sector to be headquartered in the DRC, to work with Congolese 
capital, and to be run by Congolese nationals. The law was mainly 
designed for the Congolese mining sector and was clearly intended 
to strengthen the position of Congolese subcontracting companies. 
Secondly, on February 5, 2018, Albert Yuma Mulimbi, the head of 
the state mining company Gécamines, announced that the company 
wanted to renegotiate its joint-venture contracts with foreign 
partners to increase the share of revenues flowing to the Congolese 
state. It was argued that the existing contracts failed to generate 
equitable wealth for the DRC and its people.17 Finally, on March 9, 
2018, Joseph Kabila signed a new mining code into law, after several 
years of negotiations about revisions to the mining code of 2002. 
This new code introduced a stricter fiscal regime for international 
mining corporations.18 
 General elections were held on December 30, 2018, after 
Kabila had overstayed his time in office by two years. There is credible 
evidence that the installation of Félix Tshisekedi as the new Congolese 
president did not reflect the real results from the ballot box but was 
the outcome of a negotiated agreement with Kabila. In exchange 
for the presidency, Tshisekedi is expected to support a coalition 
controlled by Kabila, allowing the latter to retain as much power 
as possible after his official departure from office (Englebert 2019). 
The fact that Tshisekedi is not the real winner of the elections and 
that he owes his victory to a deal with the Kabila regime incidentally 
leaves him with very little room for manoeuver and makes it 
extremely difficult for him to develop policies that are different from 
those of his predecessor. Tshisekedi does not have a lot of political 
experience and is also heavily dependent on networks built up by 
the Kabila regime (Jäger & Zogg 2019). Moreover, Kabila’s electoral 
platform, the FCC (Front Commun pour le Congo), won an absolute 
majority in both the national and provincial assemblies (Berwouts 
& Reyntjens 2019) and the majority of the ministerial posts in the 
65-member government were taken up by politicians belonging to 
the Kabila camp, including the position of Prime Minister, which 
went to Kabila’s ally Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba (Spillebeen 2019). 
Under the Congolese constitutional system, the elected president is 
expected to share executive power with the prime minister hailing 
from the parliamentary majority. It is the prime minister who defines 
and conducts national policy. While, before the 2018 elections, this 
so-called dual-executive system did not pose any problems since 
the president and the parliamentary majority came from the same 
political camp, the current situation is one of constant tensions 
between, on the one hand, a president from the political opposition, 
and, on the other hand, a prime minister and a parliament faithful to 
the former president.19
 The fact that it took Tshisekedi so long to put in place a 
new government, which only took office in September 2019, has 
5 ARTISANAL MINING
given rise to a lot of uncertainty in the Congolese mining sector. 
Mining companies have been left in the dark as to the extent to 
which the reforms introduced under the previous government 
will be implemented by the new one. The lack of clarity about the 
implementation of the new mining code, the law on subcontracting, 
and the revision of the joint-venture agreements has given rise to a 
wait-and-see attitude and emergent anxiety among foreign investors.20 
Many of these investors are Chinese and are known to have been close 
to the regime of Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila.21 
 One of the very few measures taken during the first months 
of Tshisekedi’s presidency concerns a ban – introduced by the 
Congolese national defense council (Conséil Supérieur de la Défense) 
in April 2019 – on the secondment of members of the national police 
force (PNC), the military (FARDC) and the Republican Guard22 
to private security companies and industrial mining corporations. 
In the past, the latter had sometimes hired personnel from public 
security forces to protect their private interests, paying them higher 
salaries than the Congolese state. The Congolese authorities decided 
to end this because they received a growing number of complaints 
about deteriorating security conditions in major cities such as 
Lubumbashi. The security forces of the state were given orders 
to return to their official duty of protecting ordinary Congolese 
citizens.23 While the ban on the secondment of state security 
personnel to private companies was a laudable attempt on the part of 
the Tshisekedi government to impose limits on the privatization of 
security in the DRC, it also created problems, especially for industrial 
mining projects like TFM and KCC facing illegal invasions of their 
concessions by groups of artisanal miners.24 
 Faced with a decrease of the prices for copper and cobalt on 
the international market, an increasingly heavy tax burden as a result 
of the new mining code, deteriorating ore grades, and problems 
with power failures and production equipment,25 CMOC (China 
Molybdenum Company Ltd), the Chinese majority shareholder 
in the TFM mining consortium, asked the Congolese government 
to do more to secure the concession against artisanal miners. Still, 
according to its account, the company did not request the army 
to be deployed.26 For its part, Glencore’s subsidiary KCC issued a 
statement in which it acknowledged the presence of FARDC troops 
in the area around its operations, adding that it had “communicated 
its expectations to the FARDC to exercise restraint and operate in 
accordance with Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights (…) and international human rights standards”.27 General 
John Numbi, who was in charge of the military operation against 
artisanal miners, told Bloomberg that the instructions had come from 
President Tshisekedi. Still, he provided few details about how the 
decision to intervene militarily had been taken. Numbi was quoted 
as saying that Tshisekedi had met with senior military officers before 
the operation and that he had instructed him to put an end to the 
theft of minerals in the concessions, on the mining sites.28 Speaking 
to reporters in Kolwezi, General Philemon Yav explained that the 
intervention of the Congolese army had been necessary to defend 
the country’s economic interests as well as to help the police, which 
had great difficulties coping with the illegal presence of thousands of 
artisanal miners in some of the industrial mines. He went on record 
saying: “By all means, we are going to kick them out of our strategic 
mines, so they don’t harm our economy.”29  
 The fact that Tshisekedi asked John Numbi to lead the military 
operation against artisanal miners indicates that, at least during the first 
year of his presidency, he still depended heavily on his predecessor’s 
political network in Katanga. John Numbi is a long-standing ally of 
the Kabila family. Over the years, he gained notoriety as the bras armé 
(literally translated: the armed arm) of Joseph Kabila and the person 
responsible for dealing with opponents of the regime.30 That being 
said, an escalation of the power struggle between Tshisekedi and 
Kabila’s political camps since the beginning of 2020 has resulted in a 
significant army reshuffle, which was announced on public television 
on July 17, 2020.31 To the surprise of many observers, Numbi lost his 
position as Inspector-General of the Congolese armed forces. While 
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for Numbi’s removal, it is 
believed that the decision was taken at the insistence of the United 
States. In a tweet, Tibor Nagy, the US Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, stated: “We welcome that US-sanctioned General 
John Numbi is no longer in his post. The United States supports 
President Tshisekedi’s commitment to improving human rights and 
professionalizing the Congolese armed forces.”32
POWER PLAY IN THE LUALABA PROVINCE
Political dynamics also influenced the incidents that occurred in 
southeast DRC between June and August 2019 at the sub-national 
level. To understand the Lualaba government’s interactions with 
artisanal miners, it is necessary to consider recent developments 
in the decentralization process. Since the 1992-1994 Conférence 
Nationale Souveraine and the period of political transition after 
the Second Congolese War (2003-2006), there have been calls to 
decentralize the Congolese state and bring state institutions closer to 
their citizens. Yet, despite the fact that it was already foreseen in the 
2006 constitution, it was not until 2015 that the decision was taken 
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to proceed to the partitioning of 6 of Congo’s 11 provinces into 26 
new provinces, a process known as découpage. 
 In July 2015, the former Katanga province was suddenly 
divided into four new provinces: Haut-Katanga, Tanganyika, Haut-
Lomami, and Lualaba. Well-informed observers of Congolese 
politics have interpreted the speeding up of the split-up of Katanga 
as a tactical move of the Kabila regime, which aimed to weaken the 
power base of former Katangese governor Moïse Katumbi Chapwe, 
one of Kabila’s main political rivals in the presidential elections of 
2018 (Englebert et al. 2018). During his mandate as a governor (2007-
2015), Katumbi had become very popular among the population 
of Katanga thanks to his relatively high degree of independence 
from the central government owing to his private business fortune, 
his chairmanship of Lubumbashi’s successful football club TP 
Mazembe, his hands-on style of governance, his good connections to 
the media, and the perception that he played an essential role in the 
province’s economic growth and development. In all likelihood, the 
Kabila camp hoped that Katanga’s break-up would deprive Katumbi 
of some of the powers that had made him so popular and would also 
lead to changes in the relationship between Katanga’s political elites 
and the general population.33
 A key figure in promoting the creation of a Lualaba province 
made up of the Kolwezi and the Lualaba districts34 was Richard 
Muyej Mangez Mans, who, between 2012 and 2014, was the 
Minister of Interior, Security, Decentralization and Customary 
Affairs at the national level. Having started his political career as a 
member of the provincial council of the opposition party UFERI35 
during the final days of the Mobutu regime, Muyej was a founding 
member of Kabila’s PPRD36 party in 2002 and served as its provincial 
chairman in Katanga until 2007.37 Following his election as the 
Lualaba province governor, Muyej has been eager to portray Lualaba 
as a business-friendly province, entering in direct competition with 
neighboring Haut-Katanga to attract foreign investors in the mining 
industry. Apart from organizing his own annual mining conference 
in Kolwezi, he also launched a media campaign to highlight the efforts 
of his administration with regards to the problem of child labor 
and environmental issues in cobalt mining, while also welcoming 
a number of initiatives to improve transparency and traceability in 
the cobalt supply chain (similar to efforts that had earlier been made 
in the 3T – Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten – sector).38 The incidents in 
and around Fungurume between June and August 2019 threatened 
to damage the Lualaba province’s reputation as an attractive and 
stable business environment. Furthermore, they also posed the risk 
of undermining Muyej’s self-constructed image of ‘papa solution’, 
a father-like powerful figure capable of offering protection and 
security, and providing a solution to every problem. 
 Finally, the riots and protest marches of artisanal miners in 
the Fungurume area have also been shaped by political dynamics 
at the local level. On the one hand, creuseurs have engaged in street 
protests because their access to mineral-bearing land has become 
increasingly limited due to the rapid expansion of industrial mining 
after the end of the Second Congolese War, as already explained in 
the second part of this research brief. On the other hand, however, 
creuseurs have also been used as pawns by big men such as customary 
chiefs and politicians.39 The latter have tried to position themselves 
as key intermediaries vis-à-vis the industrial mining company in 
matters like the creation of employment for the local population and 
the provision of compensations for people who have been forcibly 
displaced due to the start of large-scale mining projects. Local 
big men have endeavored to politically instrumentalize disorder 
by taking advantage of artisanal miners’ dissatisfaction with the 
repressive measures against their presence in and around industrial 
mining concessions.40 By demonstrating their capacity to organize 
mass protests, destabilize public life, and jeopardize the continuation 
of industrial mining activities, local strongmen have made it clear 
to both the company management and the Congolese political 
establishment in Kolwezi and Kinshasa that they are forces to be 
reckoned with and therefore deserve a place at the negotiation table.
CONCLUSIONS
This research brief aimed to examine the political dimensions 
of repressive actions against Katangese artisanal miners between 
June and August 2019, when their presence in industrial mining 
concessions was increasingly seen as a plague that urgently needed to 
be eradicated. The quote of the mining consultant at the beginning 
of this article is very telling in this regard. By referring to whack-a-
mole, a well-known game in amusement arcades in which players use 
a hammer to hit randomly appearing toy moles back into their holes, 
the consultant underlined the Sisyphean nature of governmental and 
corporate efforts to chase away artisanal miners while at the same 
time also illustrating the latter’s dehumanization. The comparison to 
moles is not incidental. In the discourse of Congolese policymakers 
and representatives of industrial mining companies, artisanal miners 
are often likened to animals that lead an underground existence and 
that continuously move in and out of sight in a disturbing manner. 
The destructive potential of artisanal miners – who are digging holes 
where they are not supposed to be digging- is presented as a legitimate 
reason for taking very harsh, repressive measures against them, much 
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in the same way as gardeners use spades to get rid of moles ruining 
their gardens.
 The analysis has shown that the phenomenon of artisanal 
miners encroaching on industrial mining concessions and now 
and then being chased away by security forces has clear political 
dimensions. The competition between industrial mining companies 
and artisanal miners for access to mineral-bearing land has grown 
increasingly tense due to price evolutions at the international 
market associated with fluctuating demand for cobalt in the current 
era of the ‘green revolution’. The most critical factors at the level 
of national politics that appear to have influenced the events in 
Fungurume include uncertainty about the future of the Congolese 
mining sector after the 2018 elections, the continuing influence of 
the Kabila network, and corporate demands to provide more robust 
protection against the invasion of industrial mining concessions by 
artisanal miners. At the sub-national level, the importance of the 
TFM mining project for Lualaba’s reputation as a mining province 
and the competition between local big men also help to account for 
the violent incidents with creuseurs between June and September 
2019.
 At the time of writing, it is difficult to make firm predictions 
about the future of the ASM-LSM nexus in southeastern DRC, 
just as it is difficult to tell what exactly will be the impact of the 
COVID-19 crisis on Katanga’s copper and cobalt mining sector. 
Tshisekedi declared a state of emergency on March 24, 2020.41 Several 
measures were taken to curb the spread of the virus, including the 
closure of schools, bars and restaurants; the imposition of a ban on 
gatherings of more than 20 people; restrictions on internal travel; the 
suspension of all flight routes both in and out of the country; and 
the closure of all land and maritime routes, except for cargo.42 Similar 
restrictive measures were taken in countries like Zambia and South 
Africa, which serve as important transit countries for Congolese 
minerals on their way to international clients. It is feared that the 
combined effects of, on the one hand, these restrictions on the free 
movement of people and goods, and, on the other hand, the decrease 
of the demand for raw materials as a result of the global economic 
slowdown, could lead to the interruption or closure of some of 
the leading industrial mining projects in Katanga. Meanwhile, 
Congo’s national Ministry of Mines decided to let artisanal mining 
activities continue because a sudden closure of the sector might lead 
to increased insecurity in urban centers resulting from any massive 
influx of large groups of unemployed creuseurs.43 
 Shortly before the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, at the 
beginning of November 2019, two remarkable developments took 
place that are likely to have a strong impact on ASM activities in the 
region. First of all, the decision was made to create the Entreprise 
Générale de Cobalt (EGC), a company controlled by the state 
mining company Gécamines. EGC was given a 5-year monopoly 
on the purchase and marketing of all artisanally mined cobalt 
in the provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba.44 Secondly, the 
government also launched the Autorité de Régulation et de Contrôle 
des Marchés des Substances Minérales Stratégiques (ARECOMS), an 
institution intended to monitor the functioning of artisanal mining 
cooperatives. ARECOMS is meant to serve as a kind of watchdog, 
preventing situations where mining cooperatives are only used to 
further the private interests of politicians and businessmen instead of 
representing and defending artisanal miners, as has often happened 
in the past. 46The creation of ECG and ARECOMS is in line with the 
spirit of resource nationalism, a trend initiated by the former Joseph 
Kabila government. It clearly signals an ambition on the part of the 
Tshisekedi government to exert more control over Congolese cobalt’s 
commercialization and get a firmer grip on the Katangese artisanal 
mining sector in general. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether, 
and to what extent, these measures will really help improve the 
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